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Abstract
Many Android applications embed webpages via WebView components and execute JavaScript code within Android.
Hybrid applications leverage dedicated APIs to load a resource and render it in a WebView. Furthermore, Android
objects can be shared with the JavaScript world. However, bridging the interfaces of the Android and JavaScript world
might also incur severe security threats: Potentially untrusted webpages and their JavaScript might interfere with the
Android environment and its access to native features.
No general analysis is currently available to assess the implications of such hybrid apps bridging the two worlds. To
understand the semantics and effects of hybrid apps, we perform a large-scale study on the usage of the hybridization APIs
in the wild. We analyze and categorize the parameters to hybridization APIs for 7,500 randomly selected and the 196
most popular applications from the Google Playstore as well as 1000 malware samples. Our results advance the general
understanding of hybrid applications, as well as implications for potential program analyses, and the current security
situation: We discovered thousands of flows of sensitive data from Android to JavaScript, the vast majority of which
could flow to potentially untrustworthy code. Our analysis identified numerous web pages embedding vulnerabilities,
which we exemplarily exploited. Additionally, we discovered a multitude of applications in which potentially untrusted
JavaScript code may interfere with (trusted) Android objects, both in benign and malign applications.
Keywords: Android Hybrid Apps, Static Analysis, Information Flow Control
1. Introduction
The usage of mobile devices is rapidly growing with An-
droid being the most prevalent mobile operating system
(global market share of 72.23% as of November 2018 [1]).
Various reports [2],[3] reveal that mobile application (app)
usage is growing by 6% year-over-year and users are pre-
ferring mobile apps over desktop apps.
Considering these statistics, industry prioritizes mobile
app development [4]. However, apps need to be developed
for various platforms, such as Android and iOS, resulting in
increased production time and cost. Traditional approaches
require creation of a native application for each platform
or of a universal web app. The former approach incurs
redundant programming efforts, whereas, the latter suffers
from the inability to access platform-specific information.
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Hybrid mobile apps combine native components with web
components into a single mobile application. Intuitively,
hybrid apps are native applications combined with web
technologies such as HTML, JavaScript and CSS. On An-
droid, a WebView [5] component, a chromeless browser [6]
capable of displaying webpages, embeds the web applica-
tions into a view of the Android app. Ionic’s developer
survey [7] shows the increasing prevalence of hybrid ap-
plications. In previous years (2015-17), app development
with native tools decreased significantly (by almost 7×),
whereas the number of hybrid apps was growing in share
of overall app development.
Due to the fact that hybrid apps combine native and web
technologies in a single app, the attack surface for malicious
activities increases significantly, as potentially untrusted
code loaded at runtime can interfere with the trusted An-
droid environment. In our study with 7,500 random appli-
cations from the Google Play Store, we found that 68% of
these apps use at least one instance of WebView and 87.9%
of these install an active communication channel between
Android and JavaScript. This includes leaking various
pieces of sensitive information, such as the user’s location.
To assess the impact on user privacy a standalone analysis
of the Android or JavaScript side is thus clearly insufficient.
However, very limited work towards linking the assessment
of both worlds can be found in the literature. Lee et al. [8]
provide a framework for hybrid communication’s type error
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discovery and taint analysis of information flows between
Android and JavaScript. However, their framework focuses
on discovering type errors. They evaluate their taint anal-
ysis on 48 apps only without providing insights into the
nature of information flows from Android to JavaScript
and vice versa. Besides, they overlook the (mis)usage of
URLs and JavaScript inside hybridization APIs. Other
related works only consider a very specific vulnerability
arising from hybridization [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
Hybrid communication leverages APIs like the loadUrl or
evaluateJavascript methods, which, from inside an Android
application, can either load a webpage into the WebView or
execute JavaScript code directly. To improve comprehen-
sion of hybrid communication we performed a study, LU-
Droid, using a framework supporting our semi-automatic
analysis of hybrid communication on Android. We extract
the information flows from Android to hybridization APIs
and thus to the JavaScript engine, to be executed in the
displayed web page (if any), and categorize these flows
into benign and transmitting sensitive data. We discovered
6,375 sensitive flows from Android to JavaScript.
The major parameter passed to loadUrl is the URL to
be loaded. We analyzed the syntax and semantics of each
URL and provide a detailed categorization. As a byproduct,
we found several vulnerabilities concerning the usage of
these URLs. We successfully exploited some of these to
demonstrate the threats.
Alternatively, loadUrl and evaluateJavascript accept raw
JavaScript code as a parameter. We encountered code
that loads additional JavaScript libraries into WebView.
Unexpectedly, we also discovered 653 applications (with
potentially untrusted JavaScript code) transmitting data
back to the Android bridge object. Therefore these apps
implement two-way communication that may jeopardize
the integrity of the Android environment, particularly as
most external JavaScript is loaded without https and is
thus prone to man-in-the-middle attacks. We found that
many apps save the runtime state of WebView to Android
before destroying that component. These apps perform var-
ious privacy leaking functions. These functions include: (1)
fingerprinting the device for advertisement or monetization
purposes and (2) obfuscating code to preclude analysis of
its semantics. We discuss the impact of our findings on po-
tential program analyses that are to automatically identify
issues of hybrid apps while taking hybrid communication
concisely into account.
Additional studies with the most popular 196 apps from
the Google Play Store and 1000 malware samples from the
AMD dataset [16] show differing properties than those by
the general benign apps. The malware ignores evaluate-
Javascript but – even though many are repackaged benign
apps – leverage many SDKs, potentially for financial gain.
Clickjacking attacks have a similar motivation. Other sce-
narios involve information theft or injection attacks. In
contrast the most popular apps display a peculiar usage of
evaluateJavascript , which differs from other apps, e.g., to
control the page navigation or to inject secrets into web
forms (however, these secrets are stored in plain text in the
apk.) We also found that security-critical popular apps like
banking do not use loadURL. Many popular apps leverage
SDKs from social networks or mobile payment.
Technically we provide the following contribution:
• Information Flow Analysis We thoroughly investigate
around 8,700 real-world Android apps, both benign
and malign. We provide statistics on the information
flows between Android and JavaScript and identify
leakage of sensitive information to the WebView.
• URL Analysis We perform an extensive analysis for
the URLs used with loadURL, extracting various fea-
tures. As a byproduct we identify applications that
are vulnerable due to unencrypted transport protocols
and exemplify the simplicity of a phishing attack.
• JavaScript analysis We inspect the JavaScript code
passed to the hybridization APIs and identify a much
smaller set distinct code snippets, most of which orig-
inating from third-part libraries. We compare the
behaviour of regular benign apps to the most popular
apps and malware and find several significant differ-
ences and security flaws. We extract relevant features
and highlight their implications on program analysis
of hybrid apps.
This paper is an extension of a conference paper [17].
This extended version adds the following main contribu-
tions:
• Support for evaluateJavaScript (section 8.2)
• Extension of the evaluation dataset to include an
– Analysis of the top 196 apps from the top 11
categories in Google Play Store (section 8.1)
– Analysis of 1000 samples from 71 families of mal-
ware from the Argus AMD malware dataset (sec-
tion 9)
• Comparison of the data usage between malware and
benign apps (section 9)
• Brief explanation of the methodology (section 4.1).
To summarize, our work advances the state-of-the-art in
understanding the usage in Android-Web hybridization and
elucidates their relevant implications on program analysis,
particularly for security and/or privacy scenarios. However,
the aim of this work is not to discover specific vulnerabilities
in Android-Web hybridization, but to provide a set of
use cases to validate future implementations of program
analyses for hybrid apps.
2. Background
2.1. Hybrid applications
A general disadvantage of native applications is that
they are bound to a specific platform. For instance an
Android application is bound to the Android platform and
cannot easily be transformed into an iOS application. A
developer wanting to support multiple platforms needs to
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implement a native application for each of these platforms
separately, multiplying the implementation effort. Alterna-
tively, web applications execute in an arbitrary web browser
and are therefore platform independent. However, they are
restricted by a browser sandbox with very limited access
to the native APIs of the mobile device. Hybrid applica-
tions have been proposed as a remedy, as they take full
advantage of both approaches. They make extensive use of
web requests, e.g., to display user interfaces. While having
access to all native API methods granted by the Android
permission system, development effort is reduced, as the
user interface and its controllers can be retrieved via web
requests and therefore do not need to be re-implemented.
2.2. WebView, loadURL, and evaluateJavaScript
Hybrid applications on Android leverage WebViews.
WebViews are user interface components that display web-
pages (without any browser bars), and thus provide a means
to implement user interfaces as web pages rather than na-
tively. The WebView class provides a loadURL method,
which loads a webpage or executes raw JavaScript. This
method comes in two variants: loadUrl(String url) and
loadUrl(String url, Map<String,String> additionalHttp-
Headers). Additional to the URL provided as argument
to the first method, the second variant accepts additional
headers for the HTTP request. Similar to a browser’s lo-
cation bar, one of the following parameters can be passed
to loadUrl : (1) a remote URL leveraging protocols such as
HTTP(S), (2) a local URL specified with protocol file, or (3)
JavaScript code via the pseudo-protocol javascript:. Web-
View leverages the appropriate renderer for each URL type
automatically. Finally, a dedicated API evaluateJavascript
executes JavaScript code directly.
3. Motivating example
In this section we will describe a simple hybrid Android
example program (Listing 1 and 2) together with the com-
munication between Android and the WebView component.
We will then motivate the rationale behind our large-scale
study to understand various factors concerning the usage
of WebViews in realistic apps.
In Listing 1, a WebView object myWebView is retrieved
from the Activity’s UI via an identifier (line 2). Execution
of JavaScript in a WebView object is disabled by default
but can be enabled by overriding its default settings (line 5).
A Java interface object can be shared with the WebView to
be accessible via JavaScript. Via this object the capabilities
of the Android world can be bridged to the Web component.
This bridge communication allows JavaScript to, e.g., access
various sensors’ data that are usually only accessible from
Android. In our example, an object of the class Leaker (see
Listing 2) is shared (Listing 1, line 8) with the WebView
object myWebView, such that every webpage loaded into
myWebView can access this object via the global variable
“Android” (i.e. “Android” becomes a persistent property
of the DOM’s global object). Finally, the method loadUrl
can be used in two ways: (1) to invoke JavaScript code
directly (prepending a javascript: pseudo-protocol to the
passed code) from Android, and (2) to load a custom URL
(line 11) (which may execute JavaScript code specified or
loaded in the web page).
Previous work [8] take a first step into analyzing the
data flows from Android to JavaScript but is only partially
sound, and concentrates on potential type errors when
passing data between the two worlds. To improve the un-
derstanding of which data flows are to be considered when
analyzing an app consisting of a combination of Android
and JavaScript code a thorough understanding of the meth-
ods addJavascriptInterface, loadUrl, and evaluateJavascript
is required. In particular, we are interested in the uses
and potential abuses of this interface in the wild and their
implications on the design of a program analysis for hybrid
apps.
Consider line 10 in Listing 1, which reveals that the
loadUrl method is invoking the showToast method defined
in the Leaker class (Listing 2, line 3). This Java method
retrieves the Android device’s unique ID and returns it to
the JavaScript code. Similar JavaScript code could also be
invoked in the loaded webpage (Listing 1, line 12) where it
might be leaked to some untrusted web server together with
more information the user enters into the web page. Note
that state-of-the-art information flow analyses for Android
cannot report this to be an illicit information flow, as they
have no information whether the WebView’s code actually
leaks the shared data (or do not even consider loadURL
a potential information sink [18]). To further investigate
this scenario, access to the executed JavaScript code is
required. However, static analysis of JavaScript code is
challenging due to its highly dynamic nature [19], and as
it additionally requires a careful inspection of the various
aspects of the WebView class and its bridge mechanism.
Therefore, it becomes critical for program analyses to fully
understand the behavior of loadUrl, evaluateJavascript and
addJavascriptInterface. The aim of our work is to provide
this information by performing a large-scale study of real-
world apps.
4. Methodology
We develop the toolchain LuDroid to facilitate the semi-
automated analysis for discovering the usage of loadUrl
and evaluateJavascript . Figure 1 presents the workflow of
LUDroid’s analysis framework, consisting of the following
modules: IFCAnalyzer, ResourceExtractor, UrlAnalyzer,
and JSAnalyzer. LUDroid decompiles an APK2 using
APKTool [20]. The decompiled output contains the app’s
resources as well as source code in the Smali [21] format.
The IFCAnalyzer module computes the set of statements
that influence the method addJavascriptInterface (i.e. the
2An APK is the binary format of an Android application.
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Listing 1: MainActivity.java
1 protected void onCreate(Bundle savesInstanceState) {
2 WebView myWebView = (WebView) findViewById(R.id.webview);
3 WebSettings webSettings = myWebView.getSettings();
4 //enable JavaScript on WebView
5 webSettings. setJavaScriptEnabled(true) ;
6 // add interface object of type Leaker to the WebView’s DOM as a property named ”Android” of the global object
7 Leaker obj = new Leaker(this);
8 myWebView.addJavascriptInterface(obj, ”Android”);
9 //case 1: invoke JavaScript from Android
10 myWebView.loadUrl(”javascript:”+” print(Android.showToast(’Hello World’))”);
11 //case 2: load a webpage ( potentially executing JavaScript) , the object ”Android” persists as property of the DOM’s global object
12 myWebView.loadUrl( ”http://www.dummypage.com”);
13 }
Listing 2: Leaker.java
1 //Add a JavascriptInterface annotation before the method you want to bridge
2 @JavascriptInterface
3 public String showToast(String toast) {
4 TelephonyManager tManager = (TelephonyManager) mContext.getSystemService(Context. TELEPHONY SERVICE);
5 String uid = tManager.getDeviceId(); // get the device ID
6 return uid ;
7 }
APKTool
UrlAnalyzer
JSAnalyzerExtract
Resources
Analysis
Module
Reporting
ResourceExtractor
IFCAnalyzer
Figure 1: The workflow of LUDroid
backward slice [22]). The backward slice is used to analyze
which information flows from the Android to the JavaScript
side. The ResourceExtractor module extracts the strings
that are passed as parameters to the two variants of the
method loadUrl and the method evaluateJavascript. This
data is stored in a database that is passed as input to the
modules UrlAnalyzer and JSAnalyzer. The UrlAnalyzer
module analyzes the URLs provided as string argument
to the two variants of the loadUrl method. It validates
the URLs and extracts various features, such as the used
protocol, which facilitates the analysis of URLs in hybrid
communication. Similarly, the JSAnalyzer module analyzes
the JavaScript code that is passed to the loadUrl and
evaluateJavascript methods. In the followings we discuss
each module in detail.
4.1. IFCAnalyzer
The aim of this module is to understand the nature
of the information flowing from Android to JavaScript.
In particular we plan to answer the following research
questions:
• RQ1.1: How pervasive is information flow from An-
droid to JavaScript?
• RQ1.2: Do these information flows include sensitive
information?
We consider a piece of information to be sensitive if leaking
it will violate its owner’s privacy. Previous work has identi-
fied APIs that return potentially sensitive information [18],
and we conservatively consider data sensitive if it originates
from any of these information sources .
Figure 2 describes the workflow of the IFCAnalyzer mod-
ule. For every occurrence of the method addJavascript-
Interface we compute its backward slice to identify the
corresponding WebView initialization. The addJavascript-
Interface method injects an Android object into the target
WebView. It takes two parameters, a Java object and the
name used to expose this object in this WebView ’s Java-
Script engine. If JavaScript is enabled in this WebView,
the loaded web pages can invoke the methods exposed by
the injected Java object (cf. Listing 2). As we are inter-
ested in the exposed functionality of this Java object, we
extract its class and exposed methods: Not all methods of
the Java object are bridged. Only methods annotated with
@JavascriptInterface are made available to JavaScript. We
then identify (potential) sensitive information flows origi-
nating from these methods: JavaScript could invoke these
methods to leak the returned sensitive information. Finally,
we store the analysis results into a database.
The backward slices leveraged by IFCAnalyzer at the
point of this writing are transitively back-tracing explicit
information flows (i.e. definition-use chains) for the vari-
ables in question. For example, in Listing 1 our analysis
computes a backward slice for the parameter obj passed
4
Create back-
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Interface
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JavaScript
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Javascript-
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potential
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Save stats
in database
yes
no
Figure 2: The workflow of IFCAnalyzer
to addJavascriptInterface and determines it to be of the
class Leaker. Further, a backward slice for its target object,
myWebView, returns the object defined in line 2. Based on
information computed via backward slicing, IFCAnalyzer
determines the bridge object, extracts the details of the
annotated methods, and stores the results in a database.
Note that information could also be transmitted by im-
plicit information flows (i.e. without def-use chains), how-
ever, implicit flows only allow to transmit information bit
by bit, e.g. in a loop. As we currently do not support string
manipulation via character arrays (cf. section 4.2), it does
not make sense to consider implicit flows when computing
backward slices. However, we consider these topics impor-
tant for a proper analysis that brides the JavaScript and
Android worlds in order to preclude certain obfuscations
of information flows.
4.2. ResourceExtractor
The loadUrl methods load a specified URL given as string
parameter (cf. Listing 1, line 12). If the input string starts
with ”javascript:”, the string is executed as JavaScript code
(cf. Listing 1, line 10). The aim of this module is to extract
the URLs and JavaScript code passed to the loadUrl meth-
ods and evaluateJavascript. We create an intra-procedural
backward slice from each of these method calls, extract the
string parameters, and store them alongside their originat-
ing class’ name. As string parameters are often constructed
via various String operations, (e.g., using the StringBuilder
class to concatenate strings), we extended LUDroid with
domain knowledge on the semantics of the Java String class.
When LUDroid detects the Smali signature of a String or
StringBuilder method it applies partial evaluation based
on the method’s semantics to statically infer the result cre-
ated by the string manipulation. However, at the time of
this writing we do not support the automatic resolution of
complex string operations based on manipulating elements
of a character array. Future work may extend the support
for such operations and thus simple obfuscations. For now
we concentrate on the features of the string parameters
that can be extracted with reasonable effort, in order to
gain timely insights on what is required for static analy-
sis of hybrid apps. The output of this module is fed to
the UrlAnalyzer and JSAnalyzer modules to interpret and
categorize the URLs and JavaScript.
4.3. URLAnalyzer
URLAnalyzer has two functions: (1) it checks the validity
of a URL, and (2) extracts its essential features. URLAn-
alyzer parses the URLs received from ResourceExtractor
and extracts the following set of features:
• Protocol - The application layer protocol of the URL,
e.g., HTTP.
• Host - This can either be a fully qualified domain or
an IP address of the corresponding host.
• Port - The port of the host the request is sent to
(optional).
• Path - The path on the host the request is sent to
(optional). Such a path can for example be specified
for HTTP or FTP URLs, but also for local file URLs.
• Search The search part of HTTP URLs (optional).
This is the remainder of a HTTP URL after the path,
e.g., ”?x=5&y=9”.
• Fragment The fragment is an optional part of the
URL that is placed at the end of the URL and sepa-
rated by #.
RFC 3986 [23] defines the specification of URLs in aug-
mented Backus-Naur form. URLAnalyzer validates each
provided URL against this definition in order to detect
malformed URLs. For every URL, URLAnalyzer either
confirms that the URL is syntactically correct, or prints a
detailed message why the URL is malformed.
We also categorize the URLs created by third-party li-
braries (SDKs). These libraries use loadUrl to provide the
intended functionality to app developers, e.g., the Face-
book SDK for Android provides Facebook’s authentication
service. Finally, URLAnalyzer creates a database contain-
ing the analysis results, so they can be reported by the
Reporting module.
With respect to the above features we answer the follow-
ing questions:
• RQ2.1: What is the distribution of protocols used in
loadURL?
• RQ2.2: What percentage of URLs point to files on
the device that are assumed to be trusted as they were
bundled with the application?
• RQ2.3: What is the distribution of hosts? Do host
hotspots exist, i.e., hosts that requests are being sent
to from many different applications?
• RQ2.4: What is the distribution of resource access
within one host discriminated by its path?
• RQ2.5: What percentage of URLs leverage unen-
crypted network communication e.g., HTTP, FTP?
• RQ2.6: Which of the external SDKs cannot be iden-
tified and are considered untrusted?
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4.4. JSAnalyzer
JSAnalyzer summarizes patterns found in JavaScript
passed to both variants of loadUrl and evaluateJavascript
(i.e. the strings constructed by ResourceExtractor). The
results are stored in a database for further manual analysis
with respect to the features described in the sequel. The
components of JSAnalyzer primarily consist of scripts for
automation and reporting.
4.4.1. Information Flow from JavaScript to Android
The Android SDK permits to annotate setter methods
with JavascriptInterface. Transmitting the results from a
web-based/JavaScript method to the Android object sup-
ports reuse of existing web-based components in Android.
It creates an information flow from the external web ap-
plication to the Android app. In this paper, we identify
use-cases of this behavior.
4.4.2. Obfuscated and Unsecured Code
Many third-party libraries employ code obfuscation to
protect their intellectual property. At the same time it is
possible to inject remote third-party libraries in JavaScript
using unsecured protocols such as HTTP. In this work we
identify patterns in which external libraries are obfuscated
or included insecurely.
4.4.3. Passing of Sensitive Information to Third Parties
Many apps pass device specific information to third-
party libraries. This sensitive information is leveraged
by third-party libraries to enhance their services, such as
targeted advertising. However, it can be detrimental to
user privacy. In this work, we identify cases of passing
sensitive information to third-parties.
In particular, we answer the following questions
• RQ3.1: How frequent is third-party script injection
used in JavaScript passed to loadUrl or evaluate-
Javascript?
• RQ3.2: Is there non-trivial information flow from
JavaScript to Android?
• RQ3.3: Do third-party libraries leverage obfuscation
for their JavaScript code?
5. Dataset Selection
We curate four different datasets containing both benign
and malware apps. Our rationale to study both is the
following: (1) the analysis of benign apps conveys infor-
mation on how developers use Android-Web hybridization
in practice, and (2) analysis on malware provides relevant
insights on the use of the feature for malicious purposes.
The former exhibits patterns which can be dangerous and
potentially exploited. The latter demonstrates that these
exploits have been exploited in practice.
We select the benign apps from the Google Play Store
and malware from the Argus AMD dataset [16]. To obtain
the benign apps, we crawled the Google Play Store based
Sensitive Flows
Injects Class
JS Enabled
Uses WebView
1,330
2,256
4,469
5,083
Figure 3: Hybrid API usage (Over 7500 apps)
on the criteria (A) and (B) below. The Argus AMD dataset
is the state of the art malware dataset available to the best
of our knowledge. In what follows, we describe the datasets
chosen for our study.
A Benign apps. In this dataset we randomly chose
7,500 apps published on the Google Play Store between
2015-2019.
B Frequently Used Apps. We selected a total of 144
of the top downloaded apps from 11 app categories on
the Google Play Store. These categories are Banking,
Business, Education, Entertainment, Health, Music,
News, Online payments, Shopping, Social, and Travel,
and are the categories of apps that were among the
highest downloaded on Play Store. In addition, we
also selected the top downloaded apps (referred as
top apps) across all categories and apps that yield the
most revenue (referred as top grossing), consisting of 52
apps. In total, we curate 13 categories of apps. Table 6
lists these categories together with the apps in each
category as of Dec 2019, when they were downloaded.
C Malware: The Argus AMD dataset contains 24,553
samples from 71 different families of malware. The
number of malware in each family range from 4 to
7843. To have a representative from each malware
family, we chose at least one from each family, but
choosing up to approx. 20% of the malwares from
each family. In total, we choose 1000 malware for the
study.
6. Evaluation — IFC and URL Analysis
All experiments were performed on a MacBook Pro with
a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 16 GB DDR3 RAM, and
MacOS Mojave 10.14.1 installed. We used a JVM version
1.8 with 4 GB maximum heap size. In the following, we
provide the inferences from our evaluation for each of the
aforementioned datasets.
We evaluated LuDroid on more than 7,500 random appli-
cations from the Google Play Store to understand hybrid
apps’ communication patterns in the wild.
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Table 1: Top ten app categories with type of information shared from Android to JavaScript
App category Type of information
Social Cookies, File system
Entertainment Account Information, File system, Network Information, Location
Music & Audio Account Information, File system, Network Information
LifeStyle Activity Information, Application level navigation affordances, Locale
Board Games Date and Time, Location, Network Information
Communication Activity Information, File system, Location, Network Information
Personalization Activity Information, Account Information, File system, Location
Books & Reference File System, Location, Network Information
Puzzle File System, Internal Memory Information, Location
Productivity File System, Internal Memory Information, Network Information
6.1. IFC from Android to JavaScript in benign apps
RQ1.1: How pervasive is information flow from Android
to JavaScript? Figure 3 provides the distribution of apps
based on various characteristics of hybrid communication.
68% out of 7,500 apps use WebView at least once, i.e.
are hybrid apps, which is a significantly high percentage.
As JavaScript is not enabled by default, 87.9% of hybrid
apps enable JavaScript while the remaining 12.1% use
WebView solely for static webpages. Half of the components
enabling JavaScript establish an interface to JavaScript
via addJavascriptInterface and bridge an Android object
to JavaScript. Therefore, 30% of the apps used in our
dataset and 43% of the hybrid apps transfer information
from Android to JavaScript. Table 1 presents the top ten
app categories and the corresponding types of information
shared with JavaScript. Note that in this work we do not
investigate what happens to this data on the JavaScript
side, i.e., whether it actually leaks to some untrusted entity.
The focus instead is to identify scenarios in the wild that
need to be taken into consideration when attempting to
design an analysis for hybrid apps.
RQ1.2: Do these information flows include sensitive
information? 18% of the total apps in our dataset share
sensitive information from Android to JavaScript. LU-
Droid finds 6375 sensitive information flows from Android
to JavaScript: Only 18% of these flow to URLs located
inside the app, i.e., using the file protocol. Note that the
inclusion of JavaScript code into an app does not guar-
antee its trustworthiness, as third party code is regularly
included into apps. Thus 82% (or more) of the sensitive
information flows could leak to potentially untrusted code.
Table 2 presents 10 randomly selected apps3 for each cate-
gory mentioned in Table 1 along with their corresponding
components and shared sensitive information. The ma-
jority of these flows include location information, network
information and file system access. Starting from HTML5,
various web APIs provide access to sensitive information
such as the geographical location of a user. In contrast to
Android’s permission system where users need to approve
3Due to the size limitation we could not publish the entire list.
https
6%
http
12%
file
41%
about:blank
41%
Figure 4: Distribution of protocols (rounded values for clarity)
the permissions just once (potentially in a completely dif-
ferent context), web users would need to approve the access
each time or they can provide it for one day. It appears
that this might be one of the reason that developers prefer
to propagate sensitive information from Android to the
Web, at the expense of users’ privacy.
6.2. URL statistics in benign apps
LUDroid resolved 3075 distinct URLs. In addition it
found 4980 URLs dynamically created using SDKs. Figure
4 shows the distribution of protocols in the resolved URLs
passed to the loadURL method (RQ2.1). 40.81% of the
URLs use the file protocol pointing to the device’s (trusted)
local files, while the remaining point to external (potentially
trusted) hosts (RQ2.2). Naturally, developers have more
control over these offline local files. While this is good
for trusted entities, malicious entities could easily launch
phishing attacks by designing offline pages that look similar
to trusted web pages. Only good user practices can prevent
these attacks from happening: Ideally, APKs should not be
downloaded from other sources than the official Play Store.
Additionally, users should properly verify app metadata
and permissions.
7
Table 2: App components with the shared sensitive information (from Android to JavaScript)
App Name Category Component Name Information shared
Instagram Social BrowserLiteFragment Cookies
TASKA AR MARYAM Entertainment Map26330 Location (GPS)
Classical Radio Musik & Audio MraidView External storage file system ac-
cess, Network Information
BLive Lifestyle LegalTermsNewFragment Location
Cat Dog Toe Board Games appbrain.a.be Location, Network Information
N.s.t. A-Tech Communication ax Location, Network Information
Pirate ship GO Keyboard Personalization BannerAd Device ID, Device’s Account in-
formation, Locale
IQRA QURAN Books & Reference Map26330 Location
Logic Traces Puzzle SupersonicWebView Location
FLIR Tools Mobile Productivity LoginWebActivity Network Information
Listing 3: WebViewActivity class in com.zipperlockscreenyellow (man-
ually translated to Java and simplified)
1 webView.removeAllViews();
2 webView.clearHistory () ;
3 webView.clearCache();
4 webView.loadURL(”about:blank”);
As local web pages come bundled with the APK files,
they can be taken into account during analysis. However,
an analysis might need to consider several security aspects
such as identifying phishing attacks, discovering privacy
leaks, or finding keyloggers.
In addition to local file URLs, we discovered that in
41.24% of the resolved cases the URL argument was
”about:blank”, which displays an empty page. Accord-
ing to Android’s WebView [5] documentation about:blank
should be used to “reliably reset the view state and re-
lease page resources”. As an example, we discovered
about:blank in the WebViewActivity class of the app
com.zipperlockscreenyellow. In this class the method kill-
WebView releases the view’s resources (see Listing 3). After
clearing the history and the cache this method opens a
blank page in the WebView.
Considering network URLs, the most-frequently loaded
hosts per category in the analyzed apps are listed in Table 3.
We found that Facebook and Google SDKs are widely used
in apps, primarily for authentication purposes. In addition
app monetization and customer analytics SDKs are found
in 18.04% of the apps (cf. Figure 5). Figure 5 displays all
host categories sorted by their share (RQ2.3). We found
that a majority of the analyzed apps use social networking
SDKs or app monetization SDKs.
Mobile application development frameworks such as Cor-
dova or PhoneGap allow developers to use HTML/CSS and
JavaScript to develop mobile apps. These libraries primar-
ily use bridge communication between native Android and
web technologies [24]. In our study we found that 1.26%
of the apps use these frameworks for mobile application
development (referred in Figure 5 as Mobile Development).
The 535 URLs that point to a network resource only
Social
App Monetization
Web Services
Untrusted/Unknown
Online App Generator
Outsourcing
Mobile Development
ECommerce
27.77
20.94
16.46
13.89
8.64
3.44
1.26
1.15
Figure 5: Distribution of SDK usage in apps by categories (Top eight)
reference 147 distinct paths. This indicates that in many
cases identical host and path combinations were requested
by multiple apps (RQ2.4). In approximately 1.68% of the
external URLs the host’s port was specified. Additionally,
20.37% of the URLs (HTTP/HTTPS) specify an argument
pattern.
While evaluating URLs we gained several relevant secu-
rity insights. We found that 11.87% of the calls to loadUrl
resulted in unencrypted network traffic, making a total
number of 365 communications. Table 4 shows five ex-
amples of unencrypted HTTP URLs together with the
packages in the corresponding app (RQ2.5). The usage of
unencrypted protocols with loadURL may result in eaves-
dropping and phishing vulnerabilities. We demonstrate
how to exploit such a vulnerability in section 6.3. Another
security threat is caused by untrusted SDKs using load-
URL. We found a total of 13.89% apps use untrusted SDKs
(RQ2.6). However, in this context untrusted may or may
not refer to a malicious SDK. It is non-trivial to classify
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Table 3: Selected list of Top-8 SDK hosts, its app share, and a common use case found in the top SDK categories
Category Host Percent Common Use Case
Social Networking Facebook 20.32 Authentication
App monetization Vungle 1.75 Monetize Apps by targeted advertising
Web Services Google 10.58 Authentication
Online App Generator SeattleClouds 5.99 Unknown (obfuscated)
Outsourcing biznessapps 1.89 Unknown (obfuscated)
Mobile Development PhoneGap 1.52 Platform-independent development
E-Commerce Amazon 1.1 Sales
Others Ons 0.8 Rendering ebooks
Table 4: Five out of 365 loadURL calls using the insecure HTTP
protocol
Package Name URL
com.JLWebSale20 11
http://www.dhcomms.
com/applications/
dh/cps/google/main_
agreepage01.html
net.pinterac.leapersheep.
main
http://pinterac.net/
dev/leapersheep/index.
php?viewall=1
com.quietgrowth.qgdroid
http://docs.google.
com/gview?embedded=
true&url=http:
//www.rblbank.com/
pdfs/CreditCard/
fun-card-offer-terms.
pdf
net.lokanta.restoran.
arsivtrkmutfagi
http://images.
yemeksepetim.com/App_
Themes/static-pages/
terms-of-use/
mastercard/mobile.htm
com.cosway.taiwan02
http://ecosway.himobi.
tw
untrusted SDKs as malicious due to absence of common
patterns in these SDKs. Therefore, we take a conservative
approach where an SDK is untrusted if there is no public
information available on the web. Clearly, security testing
of untrusted SDKs is imperative to ensure the integrity of
one’s code. However, many programmers include desired
functionalities into their projects without considering the
security implications.
Another interesting observation is the usage of online
app development platforms. These development platforms
allow users to build an application with minimal technical
effort and programming background. From the collected
data, we found using manual inspection that approximately
8.64% (cf. Figure 5) of the apps use an online app gener-
ation platform. A potential threat to these applications
is that the developer/app provider using the online app
generators neither has the knowledge about the internal
details of these apps nor do they perform rigorous test-
ing. A recent study on these online app generators (OAG)
found serious vulnerabilities for various OAG providers [25].
Again, programmers should not rely blindly on the quality
of external tools and perform additional validation of the
resulting app’s security properties. Unfortunately, OAGs
are particularly intriguing to developers with low techni-
cal expertise, so the creators of these platforms have a
responsibility.
We discovered 18 instances (see e.g. URL for
com.quietgrowth.qgdroid in Table 4) where a call to load-
URL was used to display a PDF via Google Docs, which is
considered a misuse of WebView. To deliver content such
files to users the WebView documentation recommends
to invoke a browser through an Intent instead of using a
WebView [26]. It appears that developers prefer users to
stay inside the app for viewing documentation, and thus
rather use WebView to accomplish this task.
6.3. Vulnerability Case Study: Unprotected URLs
As described in section 6.2, URLAnalyzer determines
whether a URL passed to loadURL is unprotected,
i.e. whether it points to a network resource and is not
protected by any cryptographic means (e.g. TLS). In our
evaluation we discovered 365 calls to loadURL with unpro-
tected URLs, all of which connect via HTTP.
The loadURL method embeds a web page into the An-
droid application. When using an unprotected URL for
loadURL an attacker can read the requested webpage, and
even more severe, manipulate the server’s response that
is to be displayed to the user. This is particularly critical
as an attacker-controlled webpage is then being displayed
in the context of a trusted application. The user may be
oblivious to the difference between content displayed in a
WebView and content displayed in other UI components,
as WebViews are designed to seamlessly integrate into the
native UI components. Depending on the concrete appli-
cation and the placement of the vulnerable WebView in
the native UI, various attack scenarios are possible. One
attack scenarios is a phishing attack where a malicious
login page is displayed to the user within the app. As the
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app is trusted by its users, they are likely to enter their
credentials on the phishing page.
Case Study: EndingScene app. To demonstrate the de-
scribed attack, we randomly chose one vulnerable appli-
cation, EndingScene (v 1.24), a video material promotion
app. Immediately in the initial activity, this app loads a
webpage and displays it to the user. This scenario is ideal
for an attacker, as every user will be presented this initial
front page, and the activity consists of nothing else but the
front page. In addition, it is very plausible to ask for some
type of credential on this front page.
We implemented a network attack using mitmproxy [27],
a HTTP proxy that can save and manipulate inflowing
traffic. We developed a small Python script for use in
mitmproxy. It substitutes the server’s response to the front
page request with a self-written malicious login page, which
sends the entered credentials to an attacker.
Figure 6 depicts the successful exploitation of the End-
ingScene app when using our proxy. The left-hand side
shows the regular front page of EndingScene while the right-
hand side displays the phishing page when the network
traffic is being attacked. Evidently, a malevolent entity
would create a much more convincing phishing page, our
page is for illustration purposes only, to make the attack
obvious. This type of attack in general is not new, how-
ever, related work [28, 29, 30] has not detected them in
the context of hybrid apps, which may lead to novel attack
vectors.
As the described vulnerability is caused by the lack of
encryption and signatures, it may be avoided using the
transport layer security (TLS) versions of the protocol (e.g.
HTTPS, FTPS). Additionally, it is recommendable to make
use of certificate pinning in order to prevent threats from
corrupted certification authorities.
7. Evaluation — JavaScript in Benign Apps
In what follows we present initial insights on JavaScript
code that LUDroid identified to be passed to bridge methods,
i.e., loadUrl or evaluateJavaScript.
7.1. Frequent JavaScript Code in Benign Apps
Based on our manual analysis for benign apps, we classify
the JavaScript code into two categories: (1) involving event-
driven functionality (using the interface Event), and (2)
modifying the Document Object Model (DOM) without
event-driven functionality. We found that 64% trigger
event-driven functionality while 31% modify the DOM
only. We were unable to resolve 5% of the JavaScript
strings owing to the current limitations of IFCAnalyzer.
We identified a set of 73 distinct JavaScript code clones (of
type 2 [31], i.e. syntactically identical copy where identifiers
4md5: 7516ddd1bc9d056032ac3173e71251b0
Listing 4: Dynamic Script Loading in loadUrl
1 javascript : ( function () { var
script =document.createElement(’script’) ;
2 script .type=’text/JavaScript ’ ;
3 script . src=’http://admarvel.s3.amazonaws.com/
js/admarvel mraid v2 complete.js’;
4 document.getElementsByTagName(’head’)
. item(0).appendChild( script ) ;}) ()
might have been replaced5) passed to bridge methods in all
investigated apps. Given this low number in relation to the
total number, it was not surprising to identify that most of
these originate from third-party libraries. Interestingly, the
set of code executed using evaluateJavaScript is a subset
of those executed via loadURL, therefore, we will restrict
ourselves to the discussion of the latter in the sequel.
Table 5 lists the four most frequently used JavaScript
code fragments and their usage. The most commonly used
JavaScript code snippet in our dataset originates from the
Facebook SDK. More than 32% of apps, in our dataset,
have used it at least once. This code snippet provides the
functionality to authenticate with Facebook on the web in
case the Facebook mobile app is not present in the user’s
device. The second most common JavaScript code snippet
exhibits a peculiar case. In this snippet, a DOM element
modifies an Android object. We describe further details
in Case Study 7.1.2. Similar functionality is manifested
by the fourth JavaScript code snippet. In this case, a
JavaScript code snippet, originated from an external SDK,
modifies an Android object by invoking the setter method.
In particular, both cases manifest an interesting scenario
where JavaScript modifies Android objects. Finally, the
program in the third row originates from the advertisement
library Vungle. Details regarding this case are described
in Case Study 7.1.3.
In what follows, we illustrate the four most interesting
cases relevant to understand the developers’ intentions.
7.1.1. Case Study: Third-party script injection in loadUrl
We identify the case of a third-party script injection that
occurs in 3 of the 73 codes identified. One example of
such a script is displayed in Listing 4. Similar instances
are present in 8.33% (RQ3.1) of the analyzed apps. The
script loads third-party JavaScript code by injecting a script
tag into the header of the displayed webpage, resulting
in a modification of the global state of the page. In this
example, the developers used an unsecured protocol (HTTP,
cf. Line 3, Listing 4). This scenario makes the webpage and
thus the whole Android app susceptible to a man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attack, where an attacker can intercept the
connection and replace the script loaded from script.src
with malicious JavaScript. However, the user trusts the app
and is completely oblivious to the script being downloaded
5As we only have access to decompiled binaries we are lacking the
original identifier names in most cases.
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Figure 6: The EndingScene app without and with being attacked (In a realistic attack the phishing web page may be easily copied from the
original web page)
Listing 5: Modifying the bridged Android object named SynchJS
1 javascript :window.SynchJS.setValue((function(){
2 try{
3 return JSON.parse(Sponsorpay.MBE
.SDKInterface.do getOffer ()) . uses tpn ;
4 }catch( js eval err ){
5 return false ;
6 }})()) ;
and that it might be replaced, which violates the integrity
of the app. This attack can be implemented analogously to
the attack described in Section 6.3, where the login page
was substituted by a malicious page.
7.1.2. Case Study: Information flow from JavaScript to
Android
Contrary to common intuition we identified interesting
cases of information flow from JavaScript to Android in
8.7% (RQ3.2) of the investigated apps. Listings 5 and 7
display examples of this behavior.
Listing 5 is particularly interesting as it leverages a
synchronous communication channel from Android to Java-
Script and back. In Listing 5, a method setValue() is
invoked on a bridged object SynchJS. The method set-
Value() is a setter method defined in the class Synchronous-
JavascriptInterface excerpted in Listing 6. Note that the
code of Listing 5 is generated in the method getJSValue
(line 6), where Android executes the parameter expression
in the context of the WebView and waits (line 11) for
the thread evaluating the JavaScript code to invoke the
bridged setValue method. Line 3 in Listing 5 reads the field
uses tpn of an object deserialized from a third-party library
method Sponsorpay.MBE.SDKInterface.do getOffer and
passes that value to the setter method in SynchJS. When
this method is invoked inside the WebView’s thread, the
field returnValue is changed (line 16 of Listing 6). The
implementation then notifies Android’s UI thread via a
Listing 6: Excerpt of source code for SynchJS object in Listing 5.
Source: Github [32]
1 public class SynchronousJavascriptInterface {
2 // JavaScript interface name for adding to web view
3 private final String interfaceName = ”SynchJS”;
4 private CountDownLatch latch; // Countdown latch to wait for
result
5 private String returnValue ; // Return value to wait for
6 public String getJSValue(WebView webView, String expression)
{
7 latch = new CountDownLatch(1);
8 String code = ” javascript :window.” + interfaceName +
”.setValue((function(){try{return ” + expression +
”+\”\”;}catch( js eval err ){return ’’;}}) ()) ;”;
9 webView.loadUrl(code);
10 try { // Set a 1 second timeout in case there ’ s an error
11 latch .await (1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
12 return returnValue ;
13 } catch [...] return null ; }
14 // Receives the value from the JavaScript .
15 public void setValue( String value) {
16 returnValue = value;
17 try { latch .countDown(); } catch (Exception e) {}
18 }
19 }
call to latch.countDown(), which basically implements a
simple semaphore such that the waiting Android thread
can continue its execution and return the value retrieved
from the WebView (line 12).
Listing 7 writes meta-tags information of a HTML page
to an Android object. Line 5-11 construct an array of
objects with properties property and content. This array is
then converted to a string in JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) representation (line 14) before being passed to the
processJSON() method of the bridged object HTMLOUT.
Note that due to the fact that the processJSON method
runs in a different thread than the regular Android code [26]
the Java Memory Model may not allow the Android code
11
Program Fragment %age of
Apps
Comments Randomly Se-
lected Apps
( function (){var event = document.createEvent(’Event’);
event. initEvent ( ’fbPlatformDialogMustClose’, true , true) ;
document.dispatchEvent(event);})() ;
32.25 Code from
Facebook
SDK
com.tivion.usa
com.com014.lotto
com.t1gamer.lmcs
com.ape.games.nlu
javascript :window.HTMLOUT.
processHTML(document.getElementById(’SearchResults’).
innerHTML);
16.65 Injecting
HTML
in bridge
object
HTMLOUT
com.www.Fishingmac
com.tc.veda
com.alx.roseslwp
com.mediaapp.mex
com.calcrate
VungleAdjavascript : function actionClicked (m, p) {
var q = prompt(’vungle:’ + JSON.stringify({ method: m, params: (p ? p
: null ) })) ;
if (q && typeof(q) === ’string’) {
return JSON.parse(q). result ;
}
};
function noTapHighlight() {
var l = document.getElementsByTagName(’∗’);
for (var i = 0; i < l . length ; i++) {
l [ i ]. style .webkitTapHighlightColor = ’rgba (0,0,0,0) ’ ;
}
};
noTapHighlight();
if (typeof vungleInit == ’function’) { vungleInit ($webviewConfig$);}
4.33 Code from
Vungle ad-
vertising li-
brary
Lucky-Wheel Booboo
Guess-The-Flag
com.ignm.gesu
javascript :window.SynchJS.setValue((function() {
try {return JSON.parse( Sponsorpay.MBE.
SDKInterface.do getOffer()).uses tpn;}
catch( js eval err ) {return false ;}}) ()) ;
1.9 Bridged
Communi-
cation with
Sponsorpay
SDK
com.wTieugiano
SocialNetworkCircus
BBCNews-Pashto
WoRSA
Table 5: Most frequently resolved JavaScript code
Listing 7: Information Flow from JavaScript to Android
1 ( function () {
2 var metaTags=document.getElementsByTagName(’meta’);
3 var results = [];
4 for (var i = 0; i < metaTags.length; i++) {
5 var property = metaTags[i]. getAttribute ( ’ property ’ ) ;
6 if (property && property.substring (0, ’ al : ’ . length) ===
’al:’) {
7 var tag = { ”property”:
metaTags[i ]. getAttribute ( ’ property ’ ) };
8 if (metaTags[i ]. hasAttribute ( ’content’ ) ) {
9 tag[ ’content’ ] = metaTags[i]. getAttribute ( ’content’ ) ;
10 }
11 results .push(tag);
12 } // if end
13 } //for end
14 window.HTMLOUT
.processJSON(JSON.stringify( results )) ;
15 })()
to see any changes performed to the state of the bridged
(and other) objects unless some form of synchronization is
being used as in Listing 6.
Android WebViews feature an event system that reacts
to many different events in the WebView. The Android
SDK allows developers to override the default WebView
Listing 8: Representative Java listing called from onPageFinished()
in Liberty Education App
1 public void process () {
2 ....
3 WebView v0 = p0.viewFinished;
4 ...
5 String v1 = ” javascript :... ”; //String from Listing 7
6 v0. loadUrl(v1)
7 ...
8 }
chromeless browser window and specify their own policies
and window behavior through extending a Java interface
called WebViewClient. Interestingly, we also identified
many similar code fragments during handling of WebView-
Client events. As an example, developers can modify the
behavior when e.g. the WebView client is closed. Our
study found that many developers transfer results from
JavaScript to Android after the WebView client terminates
by modifying the onPageFinished() method in the Web-
ViewClient interface to invoke JavaScript. Listing 8 shows
an example taken from the app Liberty Education where the
method process() is called from method onPageFinished()
by a series of method calls.
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Listing 9: Leaking Sensitive Information
1 function actionClicked (m,p) {
2 var q = prompt(’vungle:’ + JSON.stringify({method:m,
params:(p?p:null)})) ;
3 if (q && typeof(q) === ’string’) {
4 return JSON.parse(q). result ;
5 }
6 };
7 function noTapHighlight(){
8 var l=document.getElementsByTagName(’∗’);
9 for (var i=0; i<l. length ; i++){
10 l [ i ]. stylewebkitTapHighlightColor = ’rgba (0,0,0,0) ’ ;
11 }
12 };
13 noTapHighlight();
14 if (typeof vungleInit == ’function’) {
15 vungleInit ($webviewConfig$);
16 }
Our study shows the use of sophisticated patterns by
developers for communication from Android to JavaScript
and vice-versa. Our study shows intricate cases of using
setter methods to permit non-trivial dataflow from Java-
Script to Android, in some cases even using (required)
synchronization.
Restricting the bidirectional communication impacts the
flexibility provided by WebView to developers. Instead
static analysis techniques could be leveraged to detect
and report similar insecure data flows. However, a simple
context-insensitive static analysis on Listing 5 using ap-
proaches such as HybridDroid [8], or Bae et. al. [33] will be
unsound. The unsoundness stems from the analyses’ lim-
itation to analyze the described callback communication
methods, thus only supporting one-way communication
from Android to JavaScript. A precise and sound static
analysis would need to consider these non-trivial meth-
ods of callback communication that establish a two-way
communication channel.
7.1.3. Case Study: Device Information to Third-party
This case study illustrates leakage of device information
to third-party libraries. Listing 9 is taken from the advertis-
ing library Vungle. Line 10 removes the highlight color from
each element. Therefore, the function noTapHighlight()
makes the app susceptible to a confused-deputy attack such
as clickjacking. It obscures user clicks, making users click
on advertisements without their knowledge. Additionally,
Line 14 can potentially leak Vungle’s WebView configura-
tion object, which contains identifiable information of a
device, to some web server, in this example through the
function vungleInit(). WebView settings contain sensitive
information about the host device that is also used by
WebViewClient.
7.1.4. Case Study: Code Obfuscation in Third-Party Li-
braries
This case study shows an interesting obfuscation pattern
using loadUrl to deliberately prevent program analyzers
Listing 10: Complex control flow via JavaScript
1 javascript :( function () { Appnext.Layout.destroy( ’ internal ’ ) ; })()
Listing 11: Representative Java listing of obfuscation in Library
Code-AdLocus
1 package com.adlocus.adapters;
2 public class AdLocusAdapter {
3 ...
4 protected final WeakReference a;
5 ...
6 private WebView b;
7 ...
8 // direct methods
9 ...
10 public AdLocusAdapter(AdLocusLayout v) { ... }
11 private static WebView a(AdLocusAdapter v) { ... }
12 private void a(AdLocusLayout v) { ... }
13 ...
14 // virtual methods
15 public void a() { ... }
16 public void b() { ... }
17 public void c() { ... }
18 ...
19 }
from inferring the intended functionality. Need for obfus-
cation arises from concerns about safeguarding the intellec-
tual property, or from trying to hide debatable or, worse,
malicious behavior.
Appnext is an ad-library which is widely used for app
monetization. Listing 10 shows a code snippet found in its
library code. In this code a Java object Appnext is being
bridged and used in JavaScript invoked from Android. This
functionality could have been directly implemented in An-
droid/Java itself. It is unclear why the programmers chose
to implement it by crossing a language-bridge from Android
to JavaScript and back, which is even more expensive as
an eval in JavaScript, instead of the direct invocation. We
have discovered this pattern in 25% (RQ3.3) of the apps,
which makes this potential obfuscation pattern prevalent
among Android apps. In this case, the anonymous function
can be directly replaced by the function call.
In our study, we found an instance of obfuscation where
the WebView class itself is obfuscated. Various libraries in-
herit from the WebView class and define their own subclass
to access WebViews functionality. These subclasses are
then obfuscated using a code-obfuscator tool. Listing 11
shows an instance from the library code Ad-Locus. List-
ing 11 defines a class AdLocusAdapter which contains the
obfuscated method names such as a(),b() and c(). To
improve precision, static analysis needs to consider these
libraries and especially the obfuscation patterns present in
libraries.
By adding another layer of complexity to inter-language
analysis, obfuscation increases the difficulty for program
analysis tools to infer the actual functionality. A precise
and sound analysis of these patterns is required for useful
analysis results. Obfuscation patterns in Android apps are
discussed in detailed in a recent large scale study [34].
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Category #Apps Studied
Banking 6
Business 10
Education 8
Entertainment 16
Health 10
Online Payments 25
Music 13
News 19
Shopping 17
Social 11
Top Grossing 30
Top Apps 22
Travel 9
Total 196
Table 6: Top apps by categories
Banking
Business
Education
Entertainment
Health
Online Payments
Music
News
Shopping
Social
Top Apps
Top Grossing
Travel
0 7.5 15 22.5 30
1
5
5
2
4
2
2
7
4
2
4
6
8
25
17
9
13
17
11
18
6
14
8
6
Apps using loadUrl Apps not using loadUrl
Figure 7: Apps using loadUrl in each category
8. Evaluation — JavaScript usage in frequently
used apps
In this section we present the insights of our study of
loadUrl and evaluateJavascript on frequently used apps.
We collected the most frequently used 196 apps from the
Play Store and categorized it into 13 categories. These
categories include the most downloaded apps (referred to
as Top Apps) and apps that yield high revenues (referred
to as Top Gross). Table 6 lists our categories alongside the
number of apps studied in each category.
8.1. JavaScript from loadURL in Top 196 Apps
Using LUDroid, we prepared a corpus of JavaScript
string and objects’ fields (containing a JavaScript string,
potentially a constant) passed to loadUrl. We performed
a manual analysis of the corpus and answer the questions:
RQ2.6, RQ3.1 - RQ3.3. We observed that none of the
apps in this category injects third-party scripts remotely
over an unsecured protocol (RQ3.1).
In addition, we also provide insights on the usage of
loadUrl in these apps. Figure 7 lists the percentage of apps
Listing 12: Code from Facebook SDK found in all of the top apps
category
( function () { var event = document.createEvent(’Event’);
event. initEvent ( ’fbPlatformDialogMustClose’, true , true) ;
document.dispatchEvent(event);
})() ;
using loadUrl. We observed that none of the banking apps
we studied use loadUrl. In this app corpus we founds 50%
usage of loadUrl in categories other than Banking. These
results suggest that a majority of the popular apps, except
those related to security-critical banking tasks, leverage
loadUrl. In what follows, we describe our insights on the
usage of loadUrl in each of the categories.
In top-grossing and top apps categories, more than 70%
of apps use loadUrl. On manual inspection, we observed
that the use of loadUrl in these apps originates from SDKs.
Similar to the benign apps in the last section, either the
SDKs pass raw JavaScript or refer to a field variable within
the SDK. Approximately 76% of these are mainly related
to mobile payments or social networks (RQ2.6). Social
networking SDKs account for one-third of the usage among
these apps. Listing 12 lists the most frequent code we ob-
served in this category of apps. Other categories of SDKs
prevalent are advertisement (approx. 10%), e-commerce
(approx. 5.77%), and also file sharing SDKs such as Drop-
Box (approx. 2%). The file-sharing SDK used internally
within the DropBox app and is used for authentication.
These cases highlight the ubiquity of loadUrl use among
the top downloaded apps and strengthen our results from
the benign apps (cf. Section 7.1).
In the education apps, such as EdX and Coursera, we ob-
served that all apps leverage at least one instance of loadUrl.
We observed a total of 21 instances of its use in 8 apps. Ap-
proximately two-third of the apps leverage loadUrl provided
by the Facebook SDK (RQ2.6) by passing raw JavaScript
or accessing the URL through a field defined in the SDK.
Fortunately, none of the SDKs were untrusted (RQ2.6).
This pattern is similar to those observed in benign apps
studied in Section 7.1. We also observed another a similar
pattern of resetting the webpage using about:blank in one
app. A minority (approx. 10%) of these apps pass the
parameter to loadUrl through inter-procedural function
calls. The usage of loadUrl in the entertainment category
is similar to those in education. Here, also two-third of
the apps leverage loadUrl. Additionally we observed the
usage of the vungle ad library, which was also present in
the benign apps.
Next, we consider another category: online payments.
We observed that 76% of the apps pass object fields to load-
Url, while raw JavaScript strings account for the remaining
24%. All of these object fields are from their respective
apps. The raw JavaScript is a simple facebook login fall-
back code which is used in case the Facebook app is not
installed on the user’s device. This is in contrast with our
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Listing 13: Modifying an app’s look-and-feel
1 ( function () {
2 var topbar = document. querySelector(’#header[data−sigil =
”MTopBlueBarHeader”]’);
3 topbar. setAttribute ( ’ style ’ , ’ display :none’) ;
4 })()
previous observation that object fields passed to loadUrl
originate from SDKs.
In social apps, we perceive the use of features that modify
an app’s look-and-feel through Web APIs. Consider the
program fragment in Listing 13, where the app uses Web
APIs to modify the header section of the app, which is
implemented in WebView. Line 2 selects the element named
MTopBlueBarHeader, and line 3 removes all styling. In this
category we found two unique type-2 source code clones,
and no instances of passing objects’ fields to loadUrl.
In other categories, such as shopping and travel, we
observed a single type-2 clone of raw JavaScript shown
in Listing 12. The same code snippet is most frequent
among benign apps as well (Section 7.1). Line 2 initializes
a DOM event handler that listens to the event fbPlatform-
DialogMustClose, and line 3 dispatches the corresponding
event.
8.2. Use of evaluateJavascript in frequently used apps
We also analyzed the most frequently used apps from
the Google PlayStore to study the JavaScript code passed
to the method evaluateJavascript . In particular, we found
differences between the usage of evaluateJavascript and
loadUrl in these apps. In Section 8.2, we identified some
usage patterns of loadUrl, many of which similar to the
benign apps in Section 7.1. However, in the top 196 apps,
our study found a significant difference between the usage of
evaluateJavascript and loadUrl. We found that 26 of these
196 apps use at least one instance of evaluateJavascript .
These usages contain 158 instances of JavaScript code
fragments, forming 16 type-2 code clones. In what follows,
we elaborate two cases of frequent JavaScript code in these
apps. We also observe an unusual case which – to our
surprise – violates basic security practices.
8.2.1. Case Study — Controlling Page Navigation
In our study, we found apps using JavaScript to
control page navigation on Android, which is similar
to using a regular web page. Consider the code snip-
pet from the payment apps JioMoney and LiquidPay,
where the developers use handlers for keyboard events
in JavaScript: handleBackKey(), LoginSubmitClick(), and
document.getElementById(’loginIdxSubmitBtn’).click().
The first one registers a custom handler for handling
the back key on Android devices, while the second one
is for logging in via a submit button, and the third
one automatically initiates a click event. This case
study highlights sophisticated use of evaluateJavascript
corresponding to the sophisticated use in loadUrl (cf.
Section 7.1 and Section 8.2).
8.2.2. Case Study — LiquidPay
Table 7 displays six code snippets we identified using
LuDroid. The payment app LiquidPay uses sensitive infor-
mation in plain-text in five of its Activities. All of these five
Activities use sensitive data such as a password or Bank-ID
or perform a sensitive operation such as User Login.
The developers include sensitive values in plain-text such as
document.getElementById(’access−code’).value = ”\dots”
or document.form1.selBankID.value = ”\dots” in We-
bView (cf. Table 7). We have masked the sensitive
information by ... to protect the confidentiality of the
information of this app. This case study exemplifies a
misuse of WebView.
To the best of our knowledge, we did not find any rel-
evant work on static analysis of evaluateJavascript . Our
study on the most frequently used apps dataset reveals
that developers have found sophisticated use cases for eval-
uateJavascript . In principle evaluateJavascript provides
an alternative to loadUrl. Although evaluateJavascript is
meant to only evaluate the passed JavaScript expression,
it is also possible to mimic the functionality of loadUrl by
manipulating DOM properties. Again, this makes the ex-
isting analyses [8, 33] unsound. A more precise and sound
analysis has to also consider the data-flow between Android
and evaluateJavascript .
9. Evaluation — JavaScript usage in Malware
We manually analyzed 1000 malware samples and studied
the JavaScript passed to loadUrl and evaluateJavascript .
To our surprise, we did not find any instances of evalu-
ateJavascript use in malware. Of all malware samples we
studied, 121 samples pass JavaScript code to loadUrl, while
451 samples use loadUrl with an object’s field variable. The
121 instances of raw JavaScript constitute eight distinct
code clones (type 2) . We further performed a manual
analysis of these eight unique JavaScript codes and found
two of these JavaScript codes to be similar (type 2 clone)
to those in the benign apps. A manual analysis of the field
variables again revealed that these originate from SDKs,
similar to those we found in benign apps (cf. Table 3).
9.1. Case Study — Injecting external objects
We found a usage pattern in 88 of the 121 distinct mal-
ware codes (approx 72.73%), where the malware injects
results from the WebView into a shared Android object.
Listing 14 shows one such instance where the DOM ele-
ment named SearchResults, is passed to the method pro-
cessHTML, and the resulting HTML is accessed through
the bridge object HTMLOUT. This pattern is similar to in-
jecting external results in Android in Section 7.1. However,
in this case, it is more dangerous. By manually searching
for the package names, we find approximately 63% of the
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Program Fragment %age of Apps Comments
document.loginForm.j password.value = ”. . . ”; 9
Injects Sensitive Data
document.getElementById(’access−pin’).value = ”. . . ”; 9
document.getElementById(’access−code’).value = ”. . . ”; 9
document.logon1.PASSWORD1.value = ”. . . ”; 9
document.form1.selBankID.value = ”. . . ”; 5
document.form1.consumerEmail.value = ”. . . ”; 2
Table 7: JavaScript code passed to evaluateJavascript . Sensitive values are masked by ... to protect the confidentiality of the information in
these apps.
Listing 14: Malware injecting external results in Android object
1 window.HTMLOUT.processHTML(
document.getElementById(’SearchResults’). innerHTML);
malware are from repackaged apps. It points out that these
apps either have a malicious activity or WebView. Having
a malicious WebView is more dangerous as it potentially
exposes it to the Web.
Further, the activities (or WebView) in these apps run
with the same privileges as a regular app. For the other
37% apps, we could not find any information on the Google
Play Store. Therefore, these apps are taken down by the
user, or otherwise, these apps performed some suspicious
operation. However, with the current data that we have, it
is not possible to give further comments.
9.2. Case Study — Clickjacking
As another case study we identified is a clickjacking at-
tack. Listing 15 shows a code snippet found in five out of
121 malware (approx. 4.13% ). Similar to the case study in
Section 7.1, this code snippet is also susceptible to a click-
jacking attack. The function noTapHighlight in Listing 15
masks user-clicks by removing the feedback given to the
users (by removing the highlighted color), thus, making
them unaware of the accidental user-interactions with the
device. Line 2 of the function actionClicked serializes the
arguments passed to the method. Line 3 returns the value
of the field result after a deserialization of the previous
statement. We discover the source code in malware, and
therefore, the intent of the clickjacking attack could po-
tentially be malicious. However, owing to the limitations
of LuDroid, we could not ascertain the exact sequence of
user-interactions that invokes these functions.
The source code mentioned here is a type-2 clone of
the source code in Listing 9, which was also observed
in the benign apps in Section 7.1.3. However, it makes
the scenario more dangerous than those in benign apps
as the same technique is applied to apps with malicious
intent. This case study reveals the severity of vulnerable
patterns (Section 7.1) if exploited by malicious apps. We
attempted to map the respective source codes between
benign apps and malware. Unfortunately, a similarity could
Listing 15: Malware susceptible to clickjacking
1 function actionClicked (t , u) {
2 var r = prompt(’showToast’ + JSON.stringify({ method:
’showToast’, params: (u ? [ t , u] : [ t ]) })) ;
3 if (r && typeof r === ’string’) { return
JSON.parse(r). result ; }
4 };
5 function noTapHighlight() {
6 var l = document.getElementsByTagName(’∗’);
7 for (var i = 0; i < l . length ; i++) {
8 l [ i ]. style .webkitTapHighlightColor = ’rgba (0,0,0,0) ’ ;
9 }};
10 noTapHighlight();
Listing 16: Malware using SDK
1 ( function () {
2 var flurryadapter = window.flurryadapter = {};
3 flurryadapter . flurryCallQueue = [ ];
4 flurryadapter . flurryCallInProgress = false ;
5 flurryadapter . callComplete = function(cmd) {
6 if ( this . flurryCallQueue . length == 0 ) {
7 this . flurryCallInProgress = false ;
8 return ;
9 }
10 var adapterCall = this . flurryCallQueue .pop();
11 this . executeNativeCall ( adapterCall ) ;
12 return ”OK”;
13 };
14 //Remaining code from Flurry SDK
15 })() ;
not be established owing to the limitations of decompilation.
Decompilation mangled the variables and class names in
many cases, so building a one-to-one mapping between
malware and benign apps is not feasible.
9.3. Case Study — Analytics SDK in malware
We identify a case study where, to our surprise, we
found malware using the analytics SDK Flurry. Consider
Listing 16 where the function defines an adapter to listen to
the Flurry analytics services. The body of the anonymous
function implements the functionality possibly required for
handling of call requests stored in the call queue. We found
this pattern in 8 of 121 apps (approx. 6.61%) of apps.
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9.4. Case Study — SDK usage in malware
We also identified a case where malware uses SDKs, es-
pecially those SDKs concerned with advertising. The SDK
usage pattern is prevalent in 48.1% of the studied malware
samples. Out of these, we found 78.2% (approx. 37% of
all malware) originating from SDKs meant for advertising.
For example, consider the use of the advertising library
TapJoy in malware com.nuttyapps.sally.makeup.salon
and skloo.mobile.pud. Note that the former APK is
probably derived from a game called “Sally’s Makeup Sa-
lon”, the latter an “Ultimate Drinking” app. Malware
is often piggybacked to popular benign software and dis-
tributed via non-regulated app stores as a trojan horse in
order to be installed voluntarily by naive users. In related
work, Lee and Ryu have shown that the TapJoy library per-
forms various sensitive operations. These include launching
new activities, retrieving sensor information, and fetching
location information and app information [35]. The last
three operations potentially harm user privacy. However,
this case is more dangerous because of the malicious intent
of the built-in malware. Launching new activities through
JavaScript leads to a App to Web Injection attack [36], [35]
where the app (in this case, malware) initiates new mali-
cious activities through injected JavaScript.
A closer investigation of which functionality stems from
the regular application and in which form the attached
malware is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we
can see that malware leverages hybrid app activities in
order to satisfy its malicious intents and that analyses that
aim at analyzing the hybrid communication are bound to
provide a precise model of the communication patterns
detected in this study. Therefore our work may also serve
as a “testbed” for such analyses.
9.5. Comparison of JavaScript Usage Across Datasets
In Section 4.4, we began with three research questions
concerning the use of third-party script injection over un-
secured protocols (RQ3.1), non-trivial information flows
from JavaScript to Android, and third-party libraries us-
ing obfuscation in their JavaScript code. Besides, we also
discovered the vulnerable use case of leaking private infor-
mation through clickjacking. In this section, we summarize
our observations on the JavaScript strings passed to loadUrl
for the three categories of apps: Benign, Frequently used,
and Malware.
Table 8 presents the behavior observed across the
datasets of apps. We observed that (potential) privacy
leak is a prevalent behavior of the JavaScript code passed
to loadUrl in all of the app categories. Non-trivial informa-
tion flows from JavaScript to Android is the next typical
behavior, observed only in the benign apps and malware
dataset. Interestingly, the frequently used apps do not
show this behavior as they, primarily, use it through field
objects (mostly constant strings) of the SDKs. Obfuscated
third-parties were observed only in benign apps. Further-
more, frequently used apps and malware were free from
Category Benign
Frequently
Used
Malware
Third-party
script injection
3 7 7
Non-Trivial Infor-
mation Flow
3 7 3
Obfuscation by
Third-Party
3 7 7
Privacy leak 3 3 3
Table 8: Summary of the observed JavaScript behavior in studied
apps
third-party script injection attacks. It shows that at least
the frequently used apps adhere to basic security practices.
10. Threats to Validity
LUDroid was able to derive a plenitude of novel statis-
tics and case studies examining information flows, URL
statistics and statistics on JavaScript code. At this point
LUDroid is not a stand-alone analysis tool but merely sup-
ports manual inspection and calculation of statistical data.
The goal of this work is to present interesting insights on
how the bridge between Android and JavaScript is used in
the wild, in order to capacitate the design of automatic
program analyses that take both sides of the hybrid app
into account. Therefore, it cannot be the aim of this work
to analyze the plentitude of JavaScript code loaded through
HTML files, which requires automatic analysis due to the
sheer size of the code base.
Obviously the data we gathered depends on the corpus of
apps in the study, and there is a risk that the investigated
apps are not representative. However, due to the fact the we
randomly chose 7500 apps from a database crawled between
2015 and 2019 should guarantee that we are not biased to
any particular app format. To even out the randomness
we are adding the most popular apps and malicious apps.
Other threats to the validity of our study stem from the
limitation of our approach, which we discuss in the sequel.
10.1. Limitations of LUDroid
LuDroid leverages static analysis techniques and there-
fore inherits some of the typical challenges and limitations.
As a tool that supports manual investigation of bridge
communication we are currently not interested to handle
challenging topics like native code, reflection, dynamic con-
trol flow, obfuscation, and the fact that strings like the
URLs passed to loadURL can be constructed at runtime.
All of these obstacles have been investigated in separate
lines of research [37, 38, 39, 40, 41] , and we consider
them orthogonal to the insights we are aiming at in this
study. Note, however, that loadURL is also a dynamic
language feature that, like reflection, may execute code
constructed at runtime based on a string parameter. In-
sights gained in studies that target dynamic code execution
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(e.g. for JavaScript [42]) are also relevant to understand
the semantics of loadURL and evaluateJavascript . A fully
implemented static analysis that automatically derives in-
formation flows across the language barrier will eventually
want to at least approximate these challenging features.
Native code. In Android applications, it is possible to in-
clude native code (e.g., compiled C/C++ code) via the
Java Native Interface (JNI). Including assembler semantics
into the analysis increases its complexity significantly. For-
tunately, we have observed native code rarely during our
experiments, so we do not expect a lot of loss in terms of
the goals of this study.
Reflection, dynamic control flow and obfuscation. Reflec-
tion in Java is a means to access code features at runtime.
With reflection, it is possible to make calls and access
fields at runtime, dynamically depending on strings and
other values derived at runtime. It is, therefore, possible to
make the control and data flow entirely dependent on run-
time values, therefore eluding static analysis. At present,
LUDroid does not support analysis for reflective features.
Given this limitation, LUDroid will lack insights from apps
that intentionally use reflection to prevent static analysis
(e.g. trough obfuscation). Again, we have not encountered
high usage of reflection in any of the inspected benign and
maliciouas apps.
Limited String analysis. LUDroid requires string analysis
to resolve arguments passed to the loadURL and evaluate-
Javascript methods. For cases where the string argument is
manipulated before being passed, we implemented domain
knowledge of the Java String class as well as support for
the StringBuilder class to be able to statically derive the
results of straightforward string manipulation. However,
LUDroid does not support advanced string manipulations
such as array-based string manipulations at the current
point of time. More advanced resolution techniques are
envisioned for future analyses.
InterProcedural slicing. At the time of this writing LU-
Droid only supports intra-procedural slicing. For the fast
dissemination of typical use cases of bridge communication
this design decision was found to be sufficient, as we were
not planning to be able to present a complete picture of
communication patterns. Future analyses will have to con-
sider more complex communication scenarios to be able to
evaluate the security and/or privacy properties of an app
under investigation.
11. Related Work
Rizzo et al. [11] proposed BabelView, which models
JavaScript as a blackbox. They leverage static taint analy-
sis to detect unwanted information flows and five different
vulnerability types. Zhang et al. [43] performed a large
scale study of the WebView APIs to classify them into
four categories of web resource manipulation. Hidhaya et
al. [12] described the ”supplementary event-listener injec-
tion attack” in Android WebViews. They further proposed
a tool for automated detection of this vulnerability and a
mitigation. Li et al. [44] discovered a new type of WebView-
based attack that they call Cross-App WebView Infection
(XAWI). Mandal et al. [13] proposed a static analysis tool
to detect various vulnerabilities in Android Infotainment
applications. Their approach is based on Julia, a static
abstract interpretation analysis tool. Fratantonio et al. [14]
proposed a static analysis tool to detect malicious appli-
cation logic in Android apps. Their approach is based on
various known static analysis techniques such as symbolic
execution and inter-procedural control-dependency analy-
sis. In contrast to these approaches, our work is not limited
to specific vulnerabilities, but provides useful insights by
inspecting both Android and JavaScript code.
Lee et al. [8] proposed HybriDroid, an information flow
analysis tool based on WALA. They discussed the seman-
tics of WebView communication including type conversion
semantics between Java and JavaScript. In contrast to our
work, HybriDroid does not provide a comprehensive analy-
sis of hybridization APIs. Their approach is restricted to
the fundamental taint analysis of the Information flow from
Android to JavaScript and misses other valuable insights.
In contrast, we present the full picture of non-trivial data
and control flows that occur in Android Web-Hybridization.
Besides, we provide experience of the usage of URLs and ex-
emplarily exploit the insecure usage of URLs. Our insights
aim to improve the unsoundness in the existing analyses
and thus benefit further research.
Neugschwandtner et al. [45] proposed two attack scenar-
ios based on when the client or server is compromised. Their
approximation is quite coarse in case of privacy leakage
where a trusted channel could leak more than the required
information. Mutchler et al. [46] conducted a large-scale
study of apps using WebView aiming at the security vulner-
abilities present in these apps. However, this study focuses
only on particular types of vulnerabilities and they did
not consider the misuse of JavaScript in loadURL. Yang et
al. [15] examined so called “Origin Stripping Vulnerabilities”
caused by wrongly using the loadURL method.
Bae [33] formalized the semantics of the android in-
teroperations between Java and JavaScript. Their ap-
proach proposed a type-system based error detection for
MethodNotFound errors. However, their approach does not
consider the information flow from JavaScript to Android
Java. In addition to a large scale study, Kim et al. [47]
leveraged abstract interpretation to design a static analysis
that finds privacy leaks in android applications. Targeting
excess authorization and file-based cross site scripting at-
tacks, Chin et al. [48] proposed Bifocals, a tool to detect
these vulnerabilities. However, these analyses focused on
one particular part of the problem. Our study is targeted at
analyzing all programming patterns which may potentially
lead to vulnerabilities.
In general the analysis of unencrypted communication in
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Android apps is a well-explored topic [28, 29, 30]. For ex-
ample, Pokharel et al. [28] demonstrated eavesdropping at-
tacks on VoIP apps. However, to the best of our knowledge
no previous work has analyzed the security consequences
of unencrypted communication caused by loadURL.
12. Conclusion
In this work, we present a large-scale analysis of loadURL
and evaluateJavascript usages in real world applications.
The statistical results include numerous features, such as
information flow data, URL statistics and JavaScript code
features on a set of 7,500 randomly selected applications
from the Google Playstore, the most popular apps and 1000
malware samples. We implemented our semi-automatic
analysis approach in a tool called LUDroid that computes
the data by using slicing techniques. LUDroid discovered
many instances of vulnerabilities, e.g. concerning the us-
age of unprotected protocols in URLs. To demonstrate
the validity of these vulnerabilities we exemplarily show-
cased the exploitation of one of them. Investigating the
most popular apps and malware samples displayed differing
characteristics than those found in general benign apps.
The insights gained in this study provide valuable input
for designing program analyses that are to analyze hybrid
Android apps.
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